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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










SIEMENS MEDICAL SOLUTIONS USA, INC. 
doing business as Siemens-Healthineers 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:18-cv-04257) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 15, 2020 
________________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 






* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Katherine A. Lomaskin brought whistleblower and wrongful termination claims 
under Pennsylvania law against her former employer Siemens Medical Solutions USA, 
Inc. (“Siemens”), alleging that Siemens engaged in an improper pay-to-play scheme with 
Pennsylvania State University (“Penn State”) and that Siemens fired her for reporting the 
scheme.  The District Court granted Siemens’ motion to dismiss, holding that Lomaskin 
failed to plead facts to establish that either Siemens or Penn State engaged in waste or 
wrongdoing — necessary elements for a whistleblower claim — and that Lomaskin did 
not allege that Siemens required her to do anything illegal — a necessary element for a 
wrongful termination claim.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
We write solely for the parties and so recite only the facts necessary to our 
disposition.  Lomaskin is a former senior-level Siemens employee who alleges that 
Siemens and Penn State engaged in a scheme in which Siemens would contribute 
donations and research funding to Penn State in return for Penn State awarding Siemens 
certain non-competitive, fixed-price contracts.  Siemens company policy bars making 
gifts that could be understood as an attempt to influence a government official or offering 
anything of value in order to gain an unfair advantage, and Siemens charges its 
employees with ensuring that it and its counterparties abide by this policy.  Lomaskin 
claims that she dutifully reported the alleged scheme to her superiors, but that her 
concerns were not addressed, and that, instead, she was sidelined on projects and 
eventually taken off the Penn State account altogether.  Lomaskin reported this situation 
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to human resources, but instead of addressing her complaints, Siemens terminated her.   
Lomaskin then filed this action, claiming that Siemens violated Pennsylvania’s 
whistleblower law and wrongfully terminated her.  Regarding her whistleblower claim, 
she alleged that both Siemens and Penn State had committed waste by trading donations 
for non-competitive, fixed-price contracts, and that both Siemens and Penn State had 
committed wrongdoing because the alleged scheme violated Siemens’ internal policies.  
The District Court dismissed Lomaskin’s original complaint without prejudice and 
allowed her to replead.  However, the District Court did not allow Lomaskin to replead 
her whistleblower claim based on wrongdoing by Siemens because it held that Siemens is 
not a “public body” susceptible to such a claim.  App. 13 (citing 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
1423(a)).   
Lomaskin filed an amended complaint, and the District Court dismissed it again, 
this time with prejudice.  The District Court held that Lomaskin’s waste allegations failed 
because non-competitive, fixed-price contracts alone are not sufficient evidence of waste.  
It also held that Lomaskin could not allege “wrongdoing” by Siemens because Siemens is 
not responsible for “ensuring Penn State’s compliance” with the law or Penn State’s own 
policies.  App. 14.  Finally, the District Court held that Lomaskin failed to establish a 
claim for wrongful termination, reasoning that Pennsylvania law’s public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine did not apply because Siemens had not 
required her to commit a crime, prevented her from complying with a statutory duty, or 
discharged her when “specifically prohibited from doing so by statute.”  App. 14 (quoting 
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s order granting Siemens’ motion to dismiss.  Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone 
Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).  In reviewing an order dismissing a 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we apply the same standard as the District Court, that is, 
we “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine 
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to 
relief.”  Id. (quoting Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2016)).   
III. 
A. 
 Pennsylvania’s whistleblower law prohibits employers from retaliating against an 
employee who reports “to the employer or appropriate authority an instance of 
wrongdoing or waste by a public body or an instance of waste by any other employer.”  
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1423(a).  A “public body” includes any entity “which is funded in 
any amount by or through” Pennsylvania or its political subdivisions.  Id. § 1422.  
“Wrongdoing” is defined as “[a] violation . . . of a Federal or State statute or regulation, 
of a political subdivision ordinance or regulation[,] or of a code of conduct or ethics 
designed to protect the interest of the public or the employer.”  Id.  Finally, “waste” is 
“[a]n employer’s conduct or omissions which result in substantial abuse, misuse, 
destruction or loss of funds or resources belonging to or derived from” Pennsylvania or 
its political subdivisions.  Id. 
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Lomaskin argues that Siemens is a public body susceptible to a whistleblower 
claim based on wrongdoing because Siemens receives funds through contracts with Penn 
State.  Although this was not in her amended complaint, she asserts that it is still a live 
issue because repleading it below would have been futile given the District Court’s 
refusing to allow it.  Lomaskin contends that Siemens and Penn State committed 
wrongdoing because the alleged pay-to-play scheme violated Siemens’ corporate 
policies.  And she claims that both Siemens and Penn State committed waste because the 
alleged pay-to-play scheme produced non-competitive, fixed-price contracts between 
them. 
 Siemens responds that Lomaskin waived her right to appeal whether Siemens is a 
public body but, regardless, Siemens is not one because it is not funded by Pennsylvania.  
Second, Siemens contends that Lomaskin’s waste arguments fail because they are based 
solely on her allegations that Penn State awarded contracts to Siemens on a fixed-price, 
“non-competition basis,” which, alone, is not evidence of waste.  Siemens Br. 7.  Third, 
Siemens asserts that Lomaskin’s claim based on wrongdoing by Penn State fails because 
Siemens does not have the power to enforce the laws, regulations, and internal policies 
that bind Penn State. 
 We agree with the District Court that Lomaskin fails to state a viable 
whistleblower claim based on waste or wrongdoing by either Siemens or Penn State.  
First, although neither the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor this Court has passed on the 
issue, the federal district courts in Pennsylvania have consistently concluded that a 
private entity does not qualify as a public body merely because it receives state funds 
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through contracts with public programs or government agencies.  See, e.g., Grim v. May 
Grant Assocs., No. 18-2231, 2019 WL 358520, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2019).  We 
concur with these courts that the phrase “funded by or through” in 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 1422’s definition of “public body” refers to money “specifically appropriated by a 
governmental unit.”  Id.  Siemens does not receive appropriations from Pennsylvania or 
any of its political subdivisions, including Penn State, and so does not qualify as a public 
body under Pennsylvania whistleblower law. 
 Second, Lomaskin’s sole allegation that Penn State awarded Siemens fixed-price, 
non-competitive contracts is insufficient to support a whistleblower claim based on 
waste.  See Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 123 A.3d 300, 308 (Pa. 2015).  In Bailets, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowledged that fixed-price, non-competitive 
contracts “can involve waste for at least two reasons”:  (1) if the price is “artificially 
inflated for a politically-connected vendor who need not compete on a level playing 
field,” or (2) “if the fixed-price contract includes an item . . . which then becomes the 
subject of a supplemental contract, the price of the supplemental contract constitutes 
waste.”  Id.  Lomaskin did not plead either of these additional circumstances, nor did she 
identify any other reason why the fixed-price, non-competitive contracts here might 
involve waste.   
 Third, Lomaskin’s whistleblower claim based on alleged wrongdoing by Penn 
State fails because a report of wrongdoing must relate to a violation of a law or regulation 
that the employer is charged with enforcing.  See Rohner v. Atkinson, 118 A.3d 486, 491 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015); Gray v. Hafer, 651 A.2d 221, 224 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994), aff’d 
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669 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1995).  Siemens cannot force Penn State to adhere to its corporate 
policies, and Siemens is not responsible for ensuring Penn State’s compliance with the 
law or Penn State’s own internal policies.     
B. 
 Finally, with respect to her wrongful termination claim, Lomaskin argues that the 
District Court improperly limited Pennsylvania’s public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine; she claims that the exception applies whenever an 
employee’s termination contravenes generalized public policy interests.  In response, 
Siemens echoes the District Court’s rationale in arguing that the public policy exception 
to the employment-at-will doctrine does not apply to Lomaskin. 
 We again agree with the District Court that Lomaskin fails to plead a wrongful 
termination claim.  For Pennsylvania’s public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine to apply, Lomaskin “must point to a clear public policy articulated in the 
constitution, in legislation, an administrative regulation, or a judicial decision” that 
Siemens violated in terminating her.  Hunger v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173, 
175 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).  Lomaskin fails to do so.  Instead, she merely lists a series of 
tangentially related state laws that she believes provide evidence that her termination 
contravened public policy generally. 
IV. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
